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STATEMENT OF INITIAL OBJECTIVES

I. The Problem:

Member agencies of USIB share a reliance upon trained and experienced individuals to perform basic intelligence functions on a day-to-day basis. These persons possess a variety of position titles but, generally, they are referred to as intelligence officers, intelligence research analysts, intelligence analysts, area specialists, biographic intelligence specialists, etc. Even country desk officers might be considered part of this general category.

These analysts normally review incoming raw intelligence and evaluate, collate and synthesize intelligence, producing estimates and studies which are known in the Community as "finished intelligence". In the process of accomplishing this, they customarily exchange views with other analysts within their own organization and with their opposite numbers in other USIB agencies. This cross-fertilization of ideas and intelligence materials has become a vital part of Community operations.

The problem to be considered is to assist the analyst in the performance of those cross-fertilization functions which involve contacting analysts in other agencies. Ideally, the analyst should collect all of the facts which relate to his subject prior to developing finished intelligence. However, as a practical matter, this is usually impossible. For example, the SCIPS Report provides some measure of the immense volume and diverse locations of intelligence files in the

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Washington area. Normally, it would not be practical for an analyst to search these holdings, nor is this considered really necessary. A logical alternative is for the analyst to discuss his subject with one or more other analysts who do have knowledge of these holdings and who have developed personal expertise in the subject. For example, very often an analyst prepares an estimate in the form of a briefing paper or internal memorandum, the existence of which is known only to himself and one or two other people. A copy of this is generally retained in the analyst's working file but not in a central library where it would be identified among agency intelligence holdings. Over-reliance on central files in this instance would have failed to unearth the document which was needed.

Another typical example of the value of analyst-to-analyst communication might be a situation concerning which materials do not exist or cannot be located, but which is a matter of knowledge to a particular analyst in the Community. Under such circumstances, the problem of the action analyst is to locate the individual who possesses the knowledge he needs.

Until a few years ago, the problem of analyst-to-analyst communications did not exist. The Intelligence Community was small enough for individuals to become well acquainted with one another's activities. Today, however, this is virtually impossible due to an over-all intelligence personnel increase and due to the creation of new organizations such as DIA. We are also now witnessing a new type of development in which intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

and operations are being merged in order to focus total resources upon a given crisis area. For example, the Office of Cuban Affairs within the Department of State heads up the inter-agency Cuban Task Force. During calendar 1963, approximately 26 different offices within State and about 50 people worked either full or part-time in support of Cuban Operations. In addition, 18 departments or agencies of Government supported this effort. Not all of these agencies were in the Intelligence Community, but all of them either generated or used intelligence. It would appear that a careful study of this intelligence-operational relationship would be profitable if it were approached realistically from the analysts' viewpoint. For example, the Assistant Coordinator of Cuban Affairs during 1963 became the recipient of all intelligence estimates, proposed action plans, etc. concerning U. S. - Cuban Affairs. During this period, he generated summaries and estimates which might have been of considerable value to the Community if they had been fed into the intelligence stream.

II. Mission of the Study Group:

The proposed mission of this group is to study the problem of analyst-to-analyst communications within the Intelligence Community and to recommend the feasibility of improving these communications through USIB action. The group will prepare a study report which will include, but not be limited to, the following:

1. Definition and scope of the problem.
2. Feasibility of resolving problem through identifiable methods, techniques, or equipment applications as may be practical.

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

3. Develop a plan of action for submission to USIB. This plan will include such factors as estimated costs, recommended nature of Community participation, estimated time required, etc.

III. Scope of the Initial Study:

All USIB staff and contract organizations should be considered within the scope of this problem area and selected non-USIB elements or individuals should be included where warranted by affinity of interests. An effort should be made to develop a practical means to connect a needing analyst with a knowledgeable analyst located elsewhere in the Community who can be of assistance to him. To be considered are: 1) the need for analysts within the Community to communicate with each other; 2) the feasibility of establishing a centralized directory for the Community which would identify analysts by individual expertise, assigned project areas, including Task Force assignments; 3) the means of establishing such contact through secure channels.

IV. Schedule:

1. Problem group members are to be designated by _____.
2. Initial report to CODIB to be ready by _____.

V. Membership:

1. Members of the ad hoc problem group should be designated from each USIB Department plus NSF and NBS. Members will require full

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

security clearance and have knowledge of intelligence analysis activities on a Department-wide basis. Each member will be required to spend _____ hours on the effort during this initial period.

VI. Guidance:

1. The problem group will be under the guidance of CODIB and relate to other problem groups through the CODIB Support Staff.

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FORM DS-14 DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERDEPARTMENTAL REFERENCE	DATE November 13, 1996
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REFERRED TO

RE:

TT 011

WRITER ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THIS REFERENCE

COMMENTS:



Mr. Paul Borel received the original of the attached paper.

Bare: wrote attached. Circulated: no official position yet. Buref has agreed to chair if other agencies react favorably, agree that problem exists and is identifiable. Al Cwell would give technical assistance to Syd; Fisher keep in as tech advisor to Syd.

SIGNATURE

OFFICE OR DIVISION

Approved For Release 2002/01/24 : CIA-RDP80B01139A000300060025-8